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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 890666-CA

vs.
Priority 2

TODD DAVID WILLARD,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a prosecution
involving two second degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction
to hear this case under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989)
and Rule 26(3) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure [Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(3)(a) (Supp. 1989), repealed effective July 1,
1990.].
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did

the

trial

court properly

suppress

the evidence

discovered during a warrantless search of respondent's vehicle?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

2
2.

United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
3.

Utah Code Annotated §77-7-15, (1982):

A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant was brought before the Honorable John V. Tibbs,
District Court Judge, on charges of two counts of possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (amended 1989).

Defendant moved

to suppress the evidence prior to trial and this motion was denied
by Judge Tibbs.

Defendant renewed his motion at a bench trial on

May 31, 1989, and at this trial, after all the evidence had been
presented, Judge Tibbs granted defendants motion to suppress this
evidence.

The prosecution was dismissed, and the State appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 10, 1988, the Sevier County Sheriff's Office

set up a road block at which defendant Willard was stopped (T-3.
17).

The main purpose of this road block was a driver's license

and registration check (T-3. 23).

Defendant was asked by Deputy

Sandy 0. Roberts to produce his driver's license and vehicle
registration and defendant complied with the request (T-3. 17).
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While

Deputy

Roberts

was

observing

the

information

defendant

provided, Deputy Barney of the Sevier County Sheriff's Office told
Deputy Roberts to go ask the defendant for permission to search the
vehicle (T-3. 18-19).
The

officers

felt

that

defendant

seemed

nervous and

agitated; there were eight policemen at the scene of the road block
(T-l.

18,23,32).

verified,

and

The

then

drivers

Deputy

license

Roberts

and

walked

registration

back

to

were

defendant's

vehicle and allegedly asked if defendant would mind if his vehicle
was "looked through" (T-3. 25,27).

Defendant testified that the

officers did not ask him for permission to search his vehicle (T3. 56,57).

Deputy Roberts couldn't recall defendant's exact words

but stated that defendant said something to the effect of "It's all
right with me" (T-3. 25).

Defendant stated he made no such reply

(T-3. 56-57).
It

was

not

explained

to

the

defendant

what

he

was

consenting to; the deputies presumed that defendant would know what
was meant when asked if they could look though his vehicle (T-3.
28).

Defendant was then asked by Deputy Barney to unlock the back

of his vehicle (T-3. 34). Defendant was asked if any weapons were
within the vehicle and he replied "yes" and proceeded to retrieve
them

for

the deputy

(T-3. 34).

The

deputy

took

the

weapons

immediately from the defendant and asked him to stand aside while
the search continued (T-3. 35).
Defendant attempted to go to the back of his vehicle and
was stopped by other officers at the scene

(T-3. 35).

Deputy
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Barney went to the back of vehicle and saw a black backpack and
examined the contents of the bag (T-3. 35).

He observed what

appeared to be marijuana and a white substance.
Judge Tibbs found that once the defendant furnished the
drivers license and the registration, that the purpose of the road
block came to a close and that there was no need for the subsequent
search (T-3. 74). He felt that the issue of consent was moot at
that point (T-3. 74).
defendant

The evidence obtained in this search of

vehicle was suppressed

under

the federal

constitutions (T-3. 75) and the case was dismissed.

and state

[Judge Tibbs

made the finding that defendant specifically granted consent by
saying, "It's all right with mew so that these findings could be
"taken up" (T-3. 76).]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly suppressed the evidence obtained
in the search of defendant's vehicle under the state and federal
constitutions. The court correctly found that the detention of the
defendant

was

constitutions.

unconstitutional

under

state

and

federal

The defendant was improperly detained after his

license and registration had been checked and found to have been
proper, thus satisfying the purpose of the road block. Even if the
detention was not found to be unconstitutional, the subsequent
warrantless search of defendant's vehicle was not consented to by
the defendant.

Defendant did not give a knowing, intelligent and

unequivocable waiver of his right to be free from unlawful search
and seizures.

Any consent, if given, was the product of fear and

5
coercion.

This supports the finding that the evidence obtained in

this illegal search should be suppressed and the case be dismissed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEPUTIES LACKED THE NECESSARY REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO SEARCH DEPENDANT'S VEHICLE WITHOUT
A WARRANT OR CONSENT.
The search of defendant's vehicle was not based on the
necessary reasonable suspicion to proceed without a warrant, nor
was consent obtained.

Once

the purpose of the road block was

satisfied, the defendant should have been free to go.

The search

of the defendant's automobile has violated the defendant's immunity
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
evidence

obtained

in

the

course

of

Therefore, any and all
this

search

should

be

suppressed.
Defendant Willard was initially stopped at the road block
for no other purpose than to check his license and registration.
Once the license and registration were verified there was no reason
to detain him further.

Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1982) provides

that "a police officer may stop any person in a public place when
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in
the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense
and

may

actions."

demand
(Id.)

his

name,

address

and

an

explanation

of

his

See also, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);

State v. Menke, 787 P. 2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Even so, the

deputies lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion to have detained
the defendant and searched his automobile.
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This reasonable suspicion must be based on objective
facts that the individual is involved in criminal activity. State
v, Carpena, 714 P. 2d 674 (Utah 1986)•

Nervous behavior of an

occupant of a vehicle and lack of eye contact are not facts which
support a reasonable suspicion that a defendant is engaged in
illegal activity. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988).
The deputies testified that defendant Willard appeared nervous,
wiredr and frightened.

Indeed, this is what they based their

"hunch" on, and these facts alone do not support a reasonable
suspicion. A seizure of evidence may ordinarily only be justified
if incident to a stop for a traffic offense or based at least upon
a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupants of the
vehicle had or were going to commit a crime.

State v. Talbot, 134

U.Adv. 15 (Utah App. 1990), and since this stop was not a traffic
violation and was not based on reasonable suspicion, the evidence
was properly suppressed

and the charges dismissed against the

defendant.
POINT II
THE
SEARCH
OF DEFENDANTS
VEHICLE WAS
WARRANTLESS AND NON-CONSENSUAL WHICH VIOLATES
U.S. AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
A search and seizure may be made without a warrant if the
individual gives his consent thereto.
307 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1962).

McDonald v. United States,

Defendant did not voluntarily

consent to the search of his vehicle.

For consent to considered

voluntary, it must clearly appear that the consent to search was
intelligently and understandingly given.
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Defendant Willard did not specifically say to the deputy
that it was permissible for the deputies to look through his car.
He testified that he had no idea that his car was going
searched

in

the manner

that

it was.

The deputy

to be

to whom

he

supposedly consented can't even recall his exact words, if any were
spoken.

Deputy Roberts

defendant Willard

testified

understood

that

she just presumed

that

what the search of his automobile

would entail (T-3. 28). Where the authorities have acted without
a warrant, the legality of this action is not to be presumed. Id.
at 417.
that

The prosecution failed to meet their burden of proving

the

consent

was

unequivocably

waived

in

relying

on

a

presumption that consent was given.
In addition
knowing

and

involved.

to the

intelligent,

requirement

there

must

that

consent

be no duress

or

must

be

coercion

Wren v. United States, 352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1965).

The consent must not be the result of duress or coercion, express
or

implied.

State

v. Sierra,

754 P. 2d 972

(Utah App.

1988)

(emphasis added).

If defendant Willard had indeed said, "It's all

right,"

not

this

was

a

voluntary

statement.

Deputy

Roberts

testified at trial that there were eight deputies surrounding the
defendant and his car. No one explained anything to him concerning
the search.

Defendant was not free to come and go as he pleased.

Although he was not handcuffed, he was accompanied by two other
deputies while the search ensued.

Any attempt to stop the search

would surely have been halted, as evidenced by restraint of the
defendant when he grabbed at his backpack.

Defendant had no other
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alternative than to sit back and watch the officers rummage through
his personal belongings. This would surely frighten an individual
into consent whether or not he was engaging in illegal activities.
Consent was not given

to the deputy

to search his

vehicle, and even if it is found that the defendant did state,
"It's all right ...", the consent was coerced by frightening the
defendant into consenting, and the motion to suppress the evidence
was properly granted.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Willard did not voluntarily consent to the
search of his vehicle.

For consent to be voluntary, it must be

knowing, intelligent, not coerced. Whether or not the coercion was
the result of a constitutional or unconstitutional detention is not
the issue, the issue is simply whether or not there was coercion.
The circumstances of the search were such that defendant had no
other alternative but to consent. His consent was involuntary and
the search

was

Constitution.

in violation

of the Uniteck States and

State

Defendant Willardfs motion bo suppress was properly

granted.
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